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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN CHINA
Kiel Downey*
INTRODUCTION
The extent to which the People’s Republic of China (China)
develops and implements renewable energy 1 technology has a
significant effect on global climate change. In 2007, China surpassed
the United States to become the country that emits more carbon
dioxide per year than any other country in the world,2 and China’s
emissions have reached double-digit annual growth in the period
since then. 3 While China has the potential to increase global
emissions significantly, it also has the potential to mitigate global
emissions by developing and implementing renewable energy
technology that can mitigate its share of global emissions.
According to data from the Pew Charitable Trusts, China ranked
either number one or number two in total clean energy investment
among the G-20 countries in 2009, 2010, and 2011,4 and renewable
* Kiel Downey is Adjunct Faculty and Director of the Master of Arts in
International Studies program in the Department of Political Science,
University of South Carolina.
1
The International Energy Agency defines renewable energy as
“energy that is derived from natural processes (e.g. sunlight and wind) that
are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed. Solar, wind,
geothermal, hydro, and biomass are common sources of renewable energy.”
Topic: Renewables, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/to
pics/renewables (last visited July 26, 2012).
2
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Statistics - Total
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy (Million Metric
Tons), U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedind
ex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit
=MMTCD (last visited July 26, 2012).
3
See id. The author’s calculations are based on data from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration.
4
G-20 investments in clean energy have made up the majority of
global investments in clean energy since at least 2004. Who’s Winning the
Clean Energy Race?: 2011 Edition, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 15
(2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
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energy made up the vast majority of China’s clean energy investment
portfolio over that period. 5 As of 2011, China had more total
installed clean energy capacity than any other country in the world.6
One way in which China can develop a strong renewable energy
sector is by acquiring and adapting renewable energy technology
from other countries. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change7 (the Convention) lists the transfer of clean energy
technology among measures that can “control, reduce, or prevent”
greenhouse gas emissions, 8 and many of the Parties to the
Convention who are leading the way in clean energy investment have
come to recognize renewable energy as an important part of clean
energy. In recent years, some of the largest investors in clean energy
have made forms of renewable energy the vast majority of their
investment portfolios.9

Clean_Energy/Clean%20Energy%20Race%20Report%202012.pdf
[hereinafter THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition]; Who’s Winning the
Clean Energy Race?, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 17 (2010),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_
warming/G20%20Report.pdf? n=5939 [hereinafter THE PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS 2010 Edition].
5
See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 14;
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2010 Edition, supra note 4, at 15.
6
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 29.
7
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1982, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 165, available at http://unfccc. int/resource/docs
/convkp/conveng.pdf.
8
Id.
9
See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 14;
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2010 Edition, supra note 4, at 15; U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 7, at 23. All the G20 countries for which the Pew reports rank clean energy investment are also
Parties to the Convention. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/e
ssential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/ items/2631.php (last
visited Sept. 29, 2012); List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/par
ties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited July 16,
2012); List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observer
s/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited July 16, 2012).
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The Convention obligates its Parties to “promote and cooperate
in” the transfer of energy technology10 and obligates the “developed
country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II” of
the Convention to facilitate technology transfer to other Parties, 11
which include China.12 Actors from both China and other Parties to
the Convention, however, have argued that concerns over intellectual
property rights (IPR) are a significant barrier to the transfer of clean
energy technology to China, although for different reasons. For
example, the U.S. government has argued that widespread
intellectual property (IP) theft and unreliable IPR enforcement in
China are significant barriers to technology transfer because
investors fear counterfeiting and piracy of their IP. A 2008
International Trade Administration (ITA) report on clean energy
technology exports to China states that “[t]he latest U.S. trade losses
due to counterfeiting and piracy in China remain unacceptably
high” 13 and cites IPR as a challenge to the development of clean
energy technology business in China.14 Actors from China, on the
other hand, have argued that industrialized countries are excessively
protective of their IP, which makes their technology too expensive
for China to acquire. For example, Wang Weiquan, head of the
Clean Development Mechanism program at the China Renewable
Energy Industries Association, said in a 2009 interview, “[i]f [we]
buy [developed countries’] equipment, right now it is quite expensive.
This kind of high cost, developing countries just cannot take it.”15

10

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 7, at 5.
Id. at 8.
12
See id. at 8, 24. The Convention obligates Parties listed in Annex II
of the Convention to facilitate technology transfer to other Parties. Status of
Ratification of the Convention, supra note 9. China is a Party to the
Convention, but is not an Annex II Party.
13
Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., Clean Energy: An
Exporter’s Guide to China, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 39 (2008),
http://www.trade.gov/media/publications/pdf/china-clean-energy2008.pdf.
14
Id. at 6.
15
Shi dinghuan: fada guojia ying dapo jianpai jishu zhishichanquan
jingu (
) [Shi Dinghuan:
Developed Countries Should Break the Confines of Intellectual Property
Rights over Emissions Reduction Technology], SINA.COM (China), Dec. 15,
2009, http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20091215/21237107945.shtml.
11

石定寰：发达国家应打破减排技术知识产权禁锢
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In this article, I examine whether or not concerns over IPR
actually have been a significant barrier to the transfer of renewable
energy technology to China. I treat technology transfer as a form of
investment, based on calculations of expected risk and return, and
examine relevant risk and return factors. In examining expected risk,
I look at changes in China’s IP laws, changes in China’s enforcement
of IPR, and the ability of the Chinese renewable energy market to
turn non-Chinese IP into marketable products. In examining
expected return, I look at the potential for growth in China’s
renewable energy market, pricing in the market, and incentives for
Chinese and non-Chinese firms to partner. I then examine empirical
patenting data and anecdotal evidence and conclude that concerns
over IPR are not a significant barrier to renewable energy technology
transfer to China.

I. TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN A
BROAD SENSE
A. TECHNOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
In order to discuss technology transfer, we need to understand
how “technology” and the “transfer” of that technology are defined
in renewable energy. A narrow understanding of “technology” could
include only the machinery involved in the process of producing
energy. This article adopts a broader notion of technology, as
described by Grübler. 16 Grübler’s concept of technology includes
intangible, knowledge-based assets, such as the knowledge required
to produce that machinery, as well as the knowledge required to use
the machinery effectively.17
This characterization of technology explains the link between
renewable energy technology and IP. For example, in generating
wind power, power companies need not only physical assets like
rotors and generators, but also intangible assets, such as the
knowledge of how to maintain, repair, and improve upon those
physical assets. They need not only data collection systems, but also
an understanding of how to effectively interpret and analyze the data
they collect. There must also be an effective grid in place to pass to
16
17

See ARNULF GRÜBLER, TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL CHANGE (1998).
See id. at 20.
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consumers the energy that those wind turbines produce, and that grid
requires its own set of physical and knowledge-based assets.
B. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS INVESTMENT
The transfer of technology is fundamentally a form of
investment, based on calculations of expected risk and return. There
is no centralized international mechanism for coordinating
technology transfer. Rather, technology transfer occurs organically
among various public and private actors through channels such as
international trade, joint research efforts, licensing, and the crossborder activities of multinational corporations, all of which require
an investment of time and resources. In discussing foreign direct
investment, Salacuse says that “[i]nvestors will commit funds to a
project when in their judgment the project will yield a satisfactory
return at an acceptable level of risk,” 18 and any actor considering
transferring its renewable energy technology to China will consider
the expected risk and return in that particular market before making a
decision.
In examining risk, this article looks at the risk that IP in
renewable energy technology from industrialized countries will be
stolen, reverse-engineered, or unsuccessfully protected in China’s
legal system. The article examines some of the major steps that
China has taken since the 1990s to improve its protections for IPR,
including legal reforms and developments in IPR enforcement, as
well as the capacity of actors in China’s renewable energy sector to
turn IP acquired from non-Chinese sources into marketable products.
In examining return, this article looks at economic factors that
non-Chinese firms take into account when assessing expected return.
The article examines prospects for growth and policy support in
China’s renewable energy sector, pricing in the renewable energy
market, and incentives for non-Chinese firms to partner with Chinese
firms in order to show that IPR are not a significant factor in
calculations of expected return.

18
Jeswald Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in
Developing Countries, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 382, 386
(2000).
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II. RISK FACTORS
Criticism of China’s protection of non-Chinese IPR reflects a
variety of opinions on the issue. For example, in June 2009, thenU.S. Representative Mark Kirk said that “the Chinese essentially
were seeking ‘the stealing of all intellectual property’ related to
energy efficiency and climate change.”19 The Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) has put China on the Priority
Watch List of its Special 301 Report every year since 2006,20 and the
2009 Special 301 Report notes that “China’s IPR enforcement
regime remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent.”21 The same
report, however, notes that “when the Chinese government chooses
to exercise its political will to deal with an IPR problem, it can yield
results.”22 In subsequent Special 301 Reports, USTR has continued
to note both ongoing concerns and areas of improvement in China’s
protection of IPR.23

19
Shaun Tandon, US Draws Line with China on Climate Technology,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (June 22, 2009), http://www.google.com/host
ednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJxowxXuScWkFyiTNDYPlHwgkKWw.
20
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 26 (2012), http://www.ustr.go
v/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf; OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2841;
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906;
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 13 (2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/fil
es/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPO
RT.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2008), http://www.ustr.gov/sites
/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2007 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 18 (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_fi
le230_11122.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE
PRESIDENT, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16 (2006),
OF
THE
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf.
21
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301
REPORT, supra note 20, at 13.
22
Id.
23
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 SPECIAL 301
REPORT, supra note 20, at 26–35; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
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Since the late twentieth century, China has made two major sets
of reforms to its IPR laws to offer better protection for IPR. First,
China made significant reforms to its IPR laws in the 1990s and early
2000s as it prepared to join the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and bring its IPR regime in line with international standards. Second,
China is now developing enough of its own energy technology that it
has a homegrown incentive to increase the protection of energy
technology IPR in its market, and it has made another set of
significant reforms to its IPR laws since the latter half of the 2000s.
Together, these two sets of reforms have laid the groundwork for
more effective protection of IPR in China.
Enforcement has also become more predictable over this period.
Improvements to the letter of the law are not sufficient to ensure
greater protection of IPR, and predictability of enforcement is a
critical factor in assessing risk. Data from IP litigation in China
show that enforcement has been reasonably predictable since at least
the early 2000s.
In addition, China’s renewable energy sector as a whole has not
developed the capability to absorb any given form of pirated IP,
reducing the risk that actors in China will steal or reverse-engineer
foreign renewable energy IP. Renewable energy technology is
complex and interdependent, and many Chinese firms do not have
the complementary technology necessary to turn individual
renewable energy IP into marketable products and services.
A. REFORMS PRIOR TO WTO ACCESSION
In the 1990s and early 2000s, China made an important set of
reforms to its IPR laws in preparation to sign the WTO agreements.
The WTO agreements included the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),24 and China would
have to bring its domestic IPR legislation up to minimum
REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at 19–25;
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT,
supra note 20, at 19–23.
24
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPS].
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international standards in order to meet its obligations under TRIPS
upon accession to the WTO in 2001.25
1. THE CONTRACT LAW
No Chinese laws specifically address the protection of IP in
renewable energy technology, but in 1999, two years before China
signed TRIPS, the National People’s Congress (NPC)—China’s
national legislature—adopted the Contract Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Contract Law).26 The Contract Law contains a
chapter that focuses specifically on contracts for technology, 27 and
that chapter contains a section that focuses specifically on contracts
for technology transfer.28
The Contract Law mitigates the risk associated with technology
transfer by creating a formal framework in which IP can be
transferred. For example, it defines the types of IP that can be
transferred through a contract,29 it specifies that such contracts must
be in writing, 30 and it defines the legal obligations of both the
transferor 31 and the recipient 32 in a technology transfer agreement.
The Contract Law also obligates the recipient of transferred
technology to maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets.33
25

TRIPS binds its Parties to a broad set of standards for domestic IPR
legislation. The Preamble to TRIPS sets forth this principle. It states that the
parties to the Agreement recognize the “need for new rules and disciplines
concerning… the provision of adequate standards and principles concerning
the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights…
[and] the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of
trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in
national legal systems.” Id. at Preamble, 320.
26
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hetong fa (
)
[Contract Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999; effective Oct 1, 1999) (China) [hereinafter
Contract Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/11/content_1383564.htm.
27
Id. at ch. 18.
28
Id.
29
Id. at ch. 18, art. 342.
30
Id.
31
Id. at ch. 18, art. 345.
32
Id. at ch. 18, art. 346.
33
Id. at ch. 18, art. 348.

中华人民共和国合同法
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However, the Contract Law does not reduce all forms of risk to
non-Chinese owners of IP. For example, Article 353 appears to
increase risk to transferors of technology, because it makes the
transferor liable when the recipient exploits the patent or technical
secret under the terms of the contract in a way that “infringes upon
the legitimate rights and interests of others.” 34 This provision is
broadly worded, and transferors must be careful about what
technology they transfer and to whom they transfer it. According to
the language of this provision, however, the transferor only incurs
liability when the recipient uses the transferred technology “as
contracted” and “infringes on the lawful interests” of others.35 Thus,
at the very least, this provision gives the transferor the power to draft
a contract in a way that minimizes the risk to the transferor.
Article 329 of the Contract Law also appears to present some
risk to non-Chinese transferors of technology. Article 329 deems a
contract that “illegally monopolizes technology” 36 or “impedes
technological advancement” invalid, 37 and the 2005 Supreme
People’s Court Interpretation Regarding Several Issues in the
Application of Law for the Trial of Technology Contract Dispute
Cases 38 (Technology Contracts Interpretation) clarifies these
provisions. The Technology Contracts Interpretation states that a
contract that prohibits research and development (R&D) or
improvements upon licensed technology “illegally monopoli[zes]
technology [or] impairs technological advancement.” 39 As this
interpretation makes it easier under the law for Chinese firms that
license foreign technology to design marginal improvements and
compete with their foreign licensors, it represents an increased risk to
foreign transferors of technology. This risk is likely mitigated by the
relatively low absorptive capacity of China’s renewable energy
industry, as discussed in Part II, Section D, below.
34

Id. at ch. 18, art. 353.
Id. (emphasis added).
36
Id. at ch. 18, art. 329.
37
Id.
38
Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian
shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi (
) [Supreme People’s Court interpretation of
the applicable law, a number of issues on the trial of the technology contract
disputes] (Sup. People’s Ct., November 30, 2004) (China).
39
Id. at art. 10 (citing Contract Law, supra note 26, at art. 329).
35

案件适用法律若干问题的解释

最高人民法院关于审理技术合同纠纷
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2. THE PATENT LAW
In addition to the Contract Law, the Standing Committee of the
NPC amended the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Patent Law) in 2000,40 in preparation for compliance with TRIPS.41
As the NPC Standing Committee amended the Patent Law again in
2008,42 during China’s second major set of legal reforms, this article
examines the Patent Law in Part II, Section B, below.
3. TRIPS
In renewable energy technology, the most relevant type of IPR
protection is the patent, as it covers technological products and
processes. Also, TRIPS provides additional clarity and protection for
foreign patent holders. Article 27 of TRIPS requires all parties to the
Agreement to make patents available “for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.” 43 Article 27 gives equal protection to foreign patent
applicants by providing that “patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention,
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”44
In addition, the WTO has actually enforced China’s obligations
under TRIPS. There have been no WTO dispute settlement cases
directly involving renewable energy technology in China, but a WTO

40

中华人民共和国专利法

Zhonghua renmin gonghego zhuanlifa (
)
[Patent Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985, amended Sept. 4, 1992;
amended Aug. 25, 2000, amended Dec. 27, 2008) (China) [hereinafter Patent
Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/
content_1383992.htm.
41
J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Does the Third Amendment to China’s
Patent Law Mean to You?, JONES DAY, 1 (2009), http://www.jones
day.com/files/Publication/4bec1582-391d-497a-af19bb314ae94433
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ff879450-6699-4f2a-93fe-c33eb
7d604cc/What%20Does%20Third.pdf.
42
Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch.1, art. 1.
43
TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 2.
44
Id.
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Dispute Settlement Body panel found in 2009 that the Copyright Law
of the People’s Republic of China 45 (Copyright Law) and certain
measures of Chinese customs violated China’s commitments under
TRIPS.46 The panel did not uphold all the claims against China,47
but the case proved that China’s IPR laws could be successfully
challenged under the WTO framework.
B. DOMESTIC INNOVATION AND REFORMS IN THE LATTER HALF OF
THE 2000S
The Chinese government and Communist Party have taken steps
since the mid-2000s to encourage the development of IP—including
renewable energy—in China’s economy, and in the process they
have increased protections under the law for foreign IP within
China’s borders.
Some knowledge-based sectors of China’s
economy have experienced significant growth in recent years, and
China has dedicated significant resources to Chinese innovators. For
example, the number of patent holders in emerging market
economies grew by 33% from 1998 to 2008, but almost all of that
growth occurred in China. 48 Chinese patent holders held almost 92%
of all locally owned patents in emerging market economies in 2008.49
From 2004 to 2008, funding for science and technology activities in
China increased by 111%.50 Over the same period, expenditure on
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuzuoquan fa (中华人民共和国著作
权法) [Copyright Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
45

People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990; effective June 1, 1991; amended Oct. 27,
2001) (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383888.htm.
46
See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 134, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,
2009).
47
See id.; see also Michael Geist, Why the U.S. Lost Its WTO IP
Complaint against China Badly, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Jan. 27, 2009),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3645/125.
48
Copenhagen Econ. A/S & The IPR Co. ApS, Are IPR a Barrier to
the Transfer of Climate Change Technology?, COPENHAGEN ECON. 5 (2009),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf.
49
Id.
50
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
2009, 820, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm.
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R&D grew by 135% and increased as a share of GDP from 1.23% to
1.54%.51
China’s renewable energy sector is one of the knowledge-based
sectors that has experienced significant development since the mid2000s, in terms of both its output and its IP. For example, Figure 1
shows the net electricity generated from renewable sources from
1980 to 2010 by the four countries that generate more than any other
country: Canada, the United States, Brazil, and China. 52 At the
beginning of this period, China lagged behind the other three, but it
surpassed them all in 2005 and maintained its leading position in
each subsequent year for which data is available.

51

Id.
Figure 1 is based on data from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration did not provide data for years beyond 2010. See U.S. Energy
Info. Admin., Total Renewable Electricity Net Generation (Billion
DEPT.
OF
ENERGY,
http://www.eia.gov
Kilowatthours),
U.S.
/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=12&cid=BR,CA,CH,
US,&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit=BKWH (last visited July 25, 2012)
[hereinafter U.S. EIA, Total Renewable Electricity].
52
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Net Generation of Electricity from
Renewable Sources, 1980-2010
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Source: Based on data from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration
Figure 2 takes the period in which China held the number one
position and converts the data into annual percent changes.53 China’s
growth in generation was higher than each of Canada, the United
States, and Brazil in four out of those six years, and China’s
generation climbed to 32.59% growth in 2010, its highest growth
over that period.54 The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts
that the capacity of China’s renewable energy sector will continue to
grow. The Reference Scenario of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook
2007 projects that, from 2005 to 2030, China’s hydropower capacity
53
Id. The data in Figure 2 is based on the data in Figure 1 over the
period from 2005 to 2010. Percent change calculations are the author’s. The
U.S. Energy Information Administration does not provide data for years
beyond 2010.
54
Id.
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will increase by 153% and its wind power capacity by 2,208%. 55
The World Energy Outlook 2010 projects that, from 2008 to 2035,
China will account for approximately 20% of the global net increase
in renewable energy demand.56
Figure 2

Annual Change in Net Generation of
Electricity from Renewable Sources,
2005-2010
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Source: Based on data from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration
China’s renewable energy sector has grown not only larger, but
also more technologically sophisticated. According to data from Lee
et al., by 2009, China held significant shares of worldwide patents in
various renewable energy technologies, including over 10% of
55
World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 355 (2007), http://iea.org/publications/fr
INTERNATIONAL
eepublications/publication/weo_2007.pdf [hereinafter
ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook].
56
Id. at 99.
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worldwide patents in wind power, biomass, and concentrated solar
power (CSP).57 When those numbers are adjusted to account for the
geographic origin of the parent companies, Chinese companies still
held approximately 5% to 8% of global patents in those
technologies.58
As IP has become an increasingly important part of China’s
economy, new language in official policy documents and laws in the
latter half of the 2000s reflects an increased high-level emphasis on
encouraging knowledge-based sectors of China’s economy, including
renewable energy, as discussed in the next section. As China
increases official support for Chinese innovators, it also reduces the
expected risk for foreign innovators who are considering transferring
their IP into the Chinese market. Under the national treatment
principle in TRIPS, China has an obligation to treat the IP of other
TRIPS signatories in a manner “no less favourable” than that in
which it treats the IP of Chinese innovators, 59 giving China an
obligation to extend improved protections for IP to foreign owners of
IP who operate within China’s borders.
1. HIGH-LEVEL POLICY DOCUMENTS
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan 60 lists the following among
China’s national policy goals: “strengthening of independent
57

Bernice Lee et al., Who Owns Our Low-Carbon Future?: Intellectual
Property and Energy Technologies, CHATHAM HOUSE, 15 (2009),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%2
0Environment%20and%20 Development/r0909_lowcarbonfuture.pdf.
58
Id.
59
TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 3.
60
China’s “Five-Year Plans” are sets of national-level guidelines for
economic and social development that cover five-year increments and are
based on official recommendations from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, a high-level decision-making authority within
the Communist Party. The National People’s Congress, China’s national
legislature, approves outlines of each Five-Year Plan for official public
release, and each of these outlines is commonly referred to as a “Five-Year
Plan.” The Eleventh Five-Year Plan covers the period from 2006 to 2010.
Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan
di shiyi ge wu nian guihua gangyao (
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innovative capability, increasing research and development
expenditure as a share of GDP to 2% [by 2010], and forming a body
of superior industries that have independent intellectual property,
well-known brands, and stronger international competitiveness.” 61
China’s 2008 Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy62
also discusses the importance of IP in depth. For example, the
opening paragraph states that the Outline is “formulated for the
purpose of improving China's capacity to create, utilize, protect and
administer intellectual property, making China an innovative country
and attaining the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in
all respects.”63
2. THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
In 2007, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted China’s
first antitrust law, the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic
of China (Anti-Monopoly Law). 64 Patents grant monopoly rights to
patent holders over a fixed period of time, and of all the laws

第十一个五年规划纲要) [National development and social development in

the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Outline] (promulgated by National People’s
Cong., Mar. 16, 2006) Xinhua News Agency (China) [hereinafter Eleventh
Five-Year Plan], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/200603/16/content_4309517.htm.
61
Id. at ch. 1, § 3.
62
The Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy was issued
by the State Council, the highest executive authority in the government of
the People’s Republic of China. Guojia zhishichanquan zhanlüe gangyao
(
) [Outline of the National Intellectual Property
Strategy] (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, June 5, 2008), available at http://english.gov.cn/200806/21/content_1023471.htm.
63
Id.
64
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanlongduan fa (
) [Anti-Monopoly Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China)
[hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law], available at http://www.npc.go
v.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm; see Peter J. Wang &
Yizhe Zhang, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, JONES DAY (2007),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eb6dcb2a-624d-4242-b791cc8faa3a1e52/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4836e746-cc52-49cdb96c-d764ae9bea1a/New%20Chinese%20Anti-Monopoly.pdf.

国家知识产权战略纲要

断法

中华人民共和国反垄

2012]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN CHINA

105

discussed in this paper, the Anti-Monopoly Law poses the greatest
risk to foreign firms who transfer their IP into the Chinese market.
Wang and Zhang provide a thorough explanation of the various
provisions in the Anti-Monopoly Law that could increase risk to
foreign firms transferring IP into the Chinese market.65 One example
relates to the autonomy that licensors have to prohibit licensees from
patenting improvements to the licensors’ technology.66 Article 13(4)
prohibits “restricting the purchase of new technology or new
facilities or the development of new technology or new products.”67
Wang & Zhang note that contracts that prohibit research and
development or improvements upon licensed technology can be
interpreted as “illegal monopoly of technology” under the
Technology Contracts Interpretation,68 which could lead them to be
interpreted as “impair[ing] technological advancement.” 69 If read
together, the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Technology Contracts
Interpretation may make it difficult for foreign licensors of
technology to prevent Chinese licensees from patenting
improvements to foreign technology.
Another important provision, echoing the argument from
developing countries that IPR protection makes technology too
expensive to acquire, is Article 17(1), which prohibits “a business
operator with a dominant market position” from “selling
commodities at unfairly high prices . . . .”70 The law does not define
“dominant market position,” but it is reasonable to assume that a
65

Wang & Zhang, supra note 64, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
67
Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 64, at ch. 2, art. 13(4).
68
Wang & Zhang, supra note 64, at 3 (quoting Zuigao renmin fayuan
guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi
(
)
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on
Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes over Technology
Contracts] (Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004) (China) art. 10).
69
Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian
shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi (
) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's
Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases
on Disputes over Technology Contracts] (Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004)
(China) art. 10.
70
Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 64, at ch. 3, art. 17(1).
66
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Chinese court would be more likely to determine that a company
with a greater market share occupies a dominant market position than
a company with a smaller market share, and that certain foreign firms
hold significant market share in China’s renewable energy market.
For example, in 2007, GE Wind, a U.S. company; Gamesa, a Spanish
company; and Vestas, a Danish company, held the fourth-, fifth-, and
sixth-largest market shares in China’s wind power market,
respectfully.71
3. THE PATENT LAW
While the Contract Law, discussed earlier, contains specific
provisions for technology transfer, the Patent Law of the People’s
Republic of China (Patent Law) represents a much more significant
effort to reduce the risk associated with technology. The Patent Law,
originally adopted in 1984, was amended in 2000 72 in order to
comply with TRIPS. 73 It was amended again in 2008, 74 and this
section focuses on the 2008 amendment.
The 2008 Patent Law reflects China’s efforts to foster and
protect innovation. The purposes of the 2000 Patent Law were to
“protect patent rights for inventions, encourage inventions and
facilitate their popularization and application, encourage progress
and innovation in science and technology, and meet the needs of
socialist modernization.” 75 The 2008 amendment, however, added
the goal of “enhancing innovation capability.”76
With this goal in mind, several provisions in the amended Patent
Law significantly mitigate the risk to the owners of IP in the process
of technology transfer. 77 For example, the 2000 Patent Law
stipulates that an invention must possess “novelty” in order to be
patentable, but the law does not consider prior use or knowledge
outside of China in determining novelty.78 The amended 2008 Patent
71

Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 45.
Patent Law, supra note 40.
73
Bai et al., supra note 41, at 1.
74
Patent Law, supra note 40.
75
Id. at ch.1, art. 1.
76
Id.
77
This discussion of the significance of the 2008 amended Patent Law
in general draws on analysis by Bai et al. Bai et al., supra note 41.
78
Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch. 2, art. 22.
72
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Law extends the standard for novelty to prior use or knowledge
outside of China.79 As Bai et al. explain, this new standard requires
Chinese courts to consider public knowledge or use outside of China
when assessing patent validity.80 Under this new standard, foreign
firms may draw on a broader body of prior art in challenging patents
registered in China that they allege conflict with their own. While
the 2000 law makes it illegal to make, sell, or import a product
covered by a patent,81 the amended law expands this list of activities
to include offering to sell a product covered by a patent,82 providing
greater protection to both Chinese and foreign IP.
One aspect of the 2008 amendment to the Patent Law that could
affect renewable energy technology is its provisions that relate to
“genetic resources,”83 as these provisions could have important risk
implications in the biofuel industry. Biofuel firms are paying an
increasing amount of attention to the use of genetic engineering in
producing low-emission, “second-generation” biofuels, 84 and it is
unclear how the 2008 Patent Law would treat such technology. The
Patent law does not define “genetic resources,” yet it requires those
who want to patent products that depend on genetic resources to
disclose the source of those genetic resources, or at least explain why
they cannot disclose the source.85 At face value, this provision does
not preclude biofuel firms from patenting their inventions, but it
places an unusual burden on patent applicants,86 and it forces them to
reveal more of their IP than they had to under the 2000 amendment.

79

Id.; see also Bai et al., supra note 41.
Bai et al., supra note 41, at 1–2.
81
Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch. 1, art. 11.
82
Id.
83
Id. at ch.3, art 26. Prior to the 2008 amendment, the Patent Law did
not contain references to “genetic resources.”
84
For example, at the 2009 Bio World Congress on Industrial
Biotechnology, in July 2009, biotechnology firms gathered to discuss how
genetic engineering and biotechnology could be used to produce secondgeneration biofuels. See, e.g., John Lorinc, The Food, Energy and
Environment ‘Trilemma,’ THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 31, 2009),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/the-food-energy-andenvironment-trilemma/.
85
Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch.3, art. 26.
86
Bai et al., supra note 41, at 3 (noting that no such requirement exists
in American, European, or Japanese patent law).
80
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For this reason, this provision does increase the expected risk to
foreign transferors of biofuel technology.
Despite this risk, however, the market for biofuels in China is
relatively small, and so the risk that the Patent Law poses to biofuel
firms is a small portion of total risk for non-Chinese renewable
energy firms. For example, the World Energy Outlook 2007’s
Reference Scenario estimates that biofuels will account for only “2%
of road fuel consumption” in China by 2030.87
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN ENFORCEMENT
The legal reforms that China undertook in preparation to accede
to the WTO and again in the latter half of the 2000s have improved
protections for foreign IP in the letter of the law, but risk to foreign
investors can only decrease if effective enforcement accompanies
China’s improved laws. According to data from Sepetys and Cox’s
2009 analysis of IP litigation in China, based on data from 2002 to
2008, IP litigation in China produced predictable trends as of the late
2000s, making it easier for foreign firms to predict the outcome of
IPR litigation.88 First, the value of damages awarded by the courts
has become more predictable. Damages in IPR cases in China tend
to be low,89 but although Sepetys and Cox argue that low damages
fail to significantly deter infringers, 90 foreign firms are able to
estimate the outcome of an IPR lawsuit. According to Sepetys and
Cox, the median value of damages awarded for all IPR cases in
China in 2006 and 2007 was close to $15,000.91 This amount may
seem low, but plaintiffs in China also tend to claim low damages,92
and the median value of damages awarded is equal to approximately

87

299.

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at

88
Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual Property Rights
Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic Damages, NERA
ECONOMIC CONSULTING, 8 (2009), http://www.nera.com/extImage
/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_0109_final.pdf.
89
Id. at 6.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 8.
92
Id.
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15% of damages claimed.93 At the very least, firms can factor in IPR
litigation as a predictable cost of business.
Second, foreign firms seem to experience more favorable
outcomes in IPR litigation than Chinese firms do. Sepetys and Cox
note that in all the cases they examined in which the plaintiffs were
Chinese, the median damages awarded equaled approximately 5% of
median damages claimed.94 In the cases they examined in which the
plaintiffs were foreign, however, the median damages awarded
equaled approximately 33% of damages claimed, 95 twenty-eight
percentage points higher than the figure for Chinese plaintiffs.
Third, foreign firms are turning to Chinese courts more often,
reflecting their confidence in the courts as a viable mechanism for
resolving IPR disputes.96 In China, IPR enforcement is handled by
either the courts or by administrative agencies.97 Sepetys and Cox
note that from 2001—the year that China signed TRIPS—to 2008,
there was a 50% annual increase in the number of IPR court cases
involving foreign firms in China.98
D. ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
Although China made efforts to reform its IPR laws and improve
enforcement, one of the most important reasons that foreign firms
face a relatively low level of risk in transferring renewable energy
technology to China has nothing to do with the law, but with
“absorptive capacity.” 99 Cohen and Levinthal define absorptive
capacity as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new,
external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial
ends.”100 Most Chinese renewable energy firms have not developed

93

Id.
Id. at 13.
95
Id.
96
See id. at 4.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 5.
99
See generally Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at 28–31.
100
Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: a
New Perspective on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 128, 128 (1990).
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the capability, or absorptive capacity, to effectively turn IP acquired
from foreign firms into marketable products or services.
While China generates more electricity from renewable sources
than any other country in the world, 101 China’s renewable energy
industry is not as technologically advanced as that of some other
countries that make significant use of renewable sources of energy.
For example, China’s energy consumption comes largely from
coal,102 rather than from renewable sources; based on available data,
China’s share of electricity generated from renewable sources was
below the world average eighteen out of nineteen years between
1991 and 2009.103 China is the world’s largest consumer of biomass,
but that biomass is almost entirely traditional biomass, and only 1.5%
of China’s biomass was used in power generation in 2005.104
Patent and market share data also show that China lags behind
many industrialized countries in renewable energy technology. In
Lee et al., figure 2.7 shows that, as of 2009, China held significant
shares of worldwide patents in various renewable energy
technologies, including over 10% of worldwide patents in wind
power, biomass, and CSP.105 When those numbers are adjusted to
account for the geographic origin of the parent companies, Chinese
companies still hold approximately 5% to 8% of global patents in

101

According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
China’s net electricity generation from renewable sources was more than that
of any other country in the world between 2005 and 2010. See U.S. EIA,
Total Renewable Electricity, supra note 52 (shown in billion kilowatthours).
Note that at the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration did not provide data for years beyond 2010.
102
In 2006, 70% of China’s energy consumption came from coal. U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: China, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
1 (2010), http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. Note
that the figures updated since the writing of this paper are consistent with the
2006 figures noted here.
103
The author’s calculations are based on data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration. See U.S. EIA, Total Renewable Electricity,
supra note 52. Note that at the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration did not provide the data necessary for
calculations for years beyond 2009.
104
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at
354.
105
Lee et al. supra note 57, at 15 fig.2.7.
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those technologies,106 but the shares of Japan and the United States
increase dramatically relative to those of China after the
adjustment. 107 In addition, the data in figure 2.7, at face value,
suggests that China’s renewable energy sector is more
technologically advanced than that of the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, South Korea, Italy, Russia, and India, as China’s patent
share is greater than the patent share of any of those countries in all
the categories listed except carbon capture.108 As of 2011, however,
China’s economy was 2.6 times larger than that of France, 109 the
country in the above list with the largest economy,110 suggesting that
China does not produce as much IP per unit of GDP as those other
countries. In an environment with less density of innovation,
Chinese firms cannot simply acquire IP from firms in industrialized
countries and turn it into marketable products and services, because
those industrialized countries have developed webs of renewable
energy technology that depend on complementary technology for
support.
If renewable energy in China were as technologically advanced
as it is in industrialized countries, more Chinese companies would
occupy top market positions in China. For example, in the wind
turbine generator industry one-third of the leading companies were
foreign as of 2008.111
If Chinese renewable energy firms were able to integrate foreign
IP into their operations fluidly, there would be large markets for
pirated renewable energy IP in China. USTR periodically reports
lists of “notorious markets” around the world, in which IPR
infringement is particularly widespread, but no such renewable
energy market is included in the most recent list.112 China contained
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
See GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK (last visited Sept. 30, 2012)
http://data.worldbank.org /indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Note that at the
time of this writing, the World Bank did not provide data for years beyond
2011.
110
Id.
111
See Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13,
at 45.
112
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS (Feb. 28,
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eight out of the thirty-three notorious markets listed in 2011,113 but
these markets are primarily for consumer products such as mp3s,114
products of a very different nature than energy technology. In the
data that Sepetys and Cox consider, the companies that appear most
frequently in IPR litigation are in the entertainment and apparel
industries; 115 it is not surprising that these industries are frequent
targets for IPR infringers. Pirating mp3s or DVDs, or counterfeiting
shoes or handbags, for example, are activities that can be done with
simple, widely available technology at a low cost. The generation,
transmission, distribution, and sale of power from renewable energy
sources, however, requires a vast, complex network of products,
processes, trade secrets, and know-how. Without a strong base of its
own complementary technology, a Chinese renewable energy firm
that gains access to one piece of foreign technology cannot
necessarily integrate that piece of technology into its operations.
Black markets valued at tens of millions of dollars and above
exist for simple consumer goods in China, such as books, movies,
music, software, and video games, 116 but those goods are already
end-use consumer products and can be sold easily. If a buyer in
China purchases counterfeit DVDs, for example, he can use those
products immediately, without any intermediate steps. If a buyer
purchases stolen information regarding the chemical composition of
a biofuel, however, that buyer must have a very specialized set of
complementary skills, know-how, and equipment in order to make
use of that information.
Weak absorptive capacity also mitigates the risk that Article 329
of the Contract Law and the various provisions of the Anti-Monopoly
Law pose, discussed previously. While Chinese firms may be able to
engineer technological improvements to IP acquired from foreign

2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-andpublications/2011/.
113
Id. Calculation does not include Hong Kong.
114
Id.
115
See Sepetys & Cox, supra note 88, at 9.
116
As of September 6, 2012, the black markets for these goods in
China equaled $52 million (books), $565 million (movies), $466.3 million
(music), $8.9 billion (software), and $589.9 million (video games). China
Black Markets, HAVOSCOPE, http://www.havocscope.com/tag/china/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2012).
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sources, these Chinese firms must be able to sell or make use of those
improvements in order to profit from them.

III. RETURN FACTORS
Now that this article has examined the risks that owners of
renewable energy IP may consider before exposing that IP to the
Chinese market, it turns to return factors. Are IPR a significant
barrier to non-Chinese renewable energy firms who want to earn a
satisfactory return in the Chinese market? In China, the potential for
growth in the renewable energy sector, the extent of competition
among firms in the sector, and the incentives for foreign firms to
partner with Chinese firms lead to an expected return that outweighs
concerns about IPR.
A. PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH
Non-Chinese owners of renewable energy IP can expect China’s
renewable energy sector to continue to grow, as China’s leadership
has pledged to support the sector. China has generated tremendous
economic growth since it began major economic reforms in 1978,117
and rapidly increasing demand for energy has accompanied those
increasing levels of economic activity. For example, total primary
energy consumption in China more than quintupled from 1980 to
2009,118 and energy demand in China continues to accelerate. In the
period from 2000 to 2009 alone, China experienced over 2.6 times as

117
See GDP Growth (Annual %), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Sept. 30, 2012)
(comparing rates, showing that China’s annual GDP growth rate averaged
9.99% from 1980 to 2011). Note that at the time of this writing, the World
Bank did not provide data for years before 1980 or after 2011.
118
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Statistics Total Primary Energy Consumption, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=44&aid=
2&cid=CH,&syid=1980&eyid=2009&unit =QBTU (last visited Sept. 30,
2012) (provided in quadrillion Btu). Note that at the time of this writing, the
U.S. Energy Information Administration did not provide relevant data for
years beyond 2009.
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much growth in primary energy consumption as it had in the
preceding twenty years.119
China’s Five-Year Plans, 120 which outline high-level official
priorities, guidelines, and goals for China’s national development,
call for increased development of renewable energy. For example,
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which covers the period from 2006–
2010, cites high levels of energy resource consumption as a problem
that emerged during the rapid development of the period from 2001–
2005 121 and calls for the “implementation of preferential financial,
tax, and investment policies and mandatory market share policies, the
encouragement of renewable energy generation and consumption,
and increasing the proportion of [renewable energy] in primary
energy.” 122 The most recent plan, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 123
which covers the period from 2011–2015, calls for an increase in the
proportion of renewable energy consumption in primary energy
consumption124 and calls for an “emphasis on the development of a
new generation of nuclear power, the generation of electricity from
solar thermal energy and photovoltaic thermal energy, wind power
technology and equipment, a smart grid, and energy from
biomass.”125
Additional official documents elaborate on the guidelines
stipulated in the Five-Year Plans. For example, the Medium- to
Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan of China’s State
Council, the chief executive agency of the government, stipulates
specific targets in the installed capacity of various sources of

119

See id. (showing that from 1980 to 1999, China’s total primary
energy demand increased by 19.95 quadrillion Btu, and from 2000 to 2009, it
increased by 53.06 quadrillion Btu).
120
See Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 60.
121
Id. at ch. 1, § 1.
122
Id. at ch. 3, § 12(4).
123
Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and
Social Development, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan di shier ge wu nian guihua gangyao (
) [National development and social
development in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan Outline] (promulgated by
National People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2011), Xinhua News Agency (China),
available at http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.
124
Id. at ch. 1, § 3.
125
Id. at ch. 1, § 10.
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renewable energy. 126 The Renewable Energy Law of the People’s
Republic of China127 (Renewable Energy Law) also contributes to the
supportive policy framework for renewable energy.128 It mandates
grid access for renewable electricity 129 and establishes a feed-in
tariff130 to ensure that there are buyers for renewable electricity. It
also encourages preferential loans for renewable energy projects,131
and it commits the government to offering renewable energy project
tax benefits,132 which have been implemented for a wide variety of
renewable energy technologies.133 The Renewable Energy Law also
establishes funding for research, development, and demonstration in
renewable energy technology.134
B. COMPETITIVE PRICING
As mentioned previously, actors in China have argued that IPR
are a barrier to technology transfer because firms with exclusive
rights to their IP are able to charge prices for their technology that
are too high for developing countries to afford. In China’s renewable
energy market, however, there is enough competition and diversity in
the renewable energy market that monopolistic pricing is not possible.
126

Medium- to Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan,
Kezaisheng nengyuan zhongchangqi fazhan guihua (
) [Renewable energy and long-term development planning]
(promulgated by State Council of the People’s Republic of China, effective
June 7, 2007), available at http://img2.dichan.com/docs/2010/1/30/
20100130231553858005.pdf.
127
Zhonghua renmin gonghheguo ke zai sheng nengyuan fa (
) [Renewable Energy Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1,
2006) (China) [hereinafter Renewable Energy Law], available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384096.htm.
128
For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Renewable Energy
Law, see Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at
27–28.
129
Renewable Energy Law, supra note 127, at ch. 4, art. 14.
130
Id. at ch. 5, art. 19.
131
Id. at ch. 6, art. 25.
132
Id. at ch. 6, art. 26.
133
See Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13,
at 29–30.
134
Renewable Energy Law, supra note 127, at ch. 3, art. 12.
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Premiums on IP have been brought down to competitive levels, and
foreign firms can expect reasonable returns under these market
conditions.
Data reported by the ITA shows that no foreign firms dominate
any of the various renewable energy markets in China. For example,
in the wind power market, there were “over 80 wind turbine
generator manufacturers and 200 wind developers” as of 2008 and
Chinese companies occupied over 75% of the market. 135
Furthermore, according to the World Energy Outlook 2007,
competition between Chinese and foreign firms in the wind power
market may “put downward pressure on turbine prices.”136 Chinese
companies also dominate the market in solar power and
hydropower.137
In those industries where prices are still high, Copenhagen
Economics and ApS note that high costs are more likely due to the
immaturity of the technologies than to premiums on IP.138 The same
report notes that China has been able to take advantage of certain
kinds of technology at a lower cost than others, even with a premium
on IP, because the efficiency of those technologies drives prices
down.139 The World Business Council for Sustainable Development
notes that “royalty costs for energy patents [represent] a small
percentage of the total investment cost,”140 and Lee et al. elaborate on
this point by explaining that it is the lack of capital and management,
rather than IPR premiums, that bars energy technology transfer to
developing countries.141

45.
355.
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Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at

136

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at
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Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at

44–48.
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Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at 16.
Id. at 17.
140
Towards a Low-Carbon Economy: a Business Contribution to the
International Energy & Climate Debate, WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 9 (2009), http://www.wbcsd.org/Page
s/EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=10987&NoSearchContextKey=tr
ue.
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Lee et al., supra note 57, at 8.
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C. INCENTIVES TO PARTNER
Foreign firms stand to gain greater returns in the long run when
they share or develop IP with Chinese partner companies than when
they try to deal with Chinese companies at arm’s length in order to
protect their IP. The traditional arguments for why IPR are a barrier
to technology transfer assume IP originates entirely from foreign
firms and moves entirely into the hands of Chinese firms, but in
reality, the relationship is more complex. In a sector that requires a
complex body of specialized, interdependent technology and a
business environment that values relationships, foreign firms that
commit to sharing or developing their IP with Chinese partners can
create relationships in which neither partner has an incentive to
jeopardize the relationship.
Chinese companies can offer certain complementarities to
foreign companies that make partnerships profitable. Chinese
companies can help foreign companies navigate the local cultural
environment and provide networks of local industry contacts, and
they can provide cheaper labor and management than companies
from industrialized countries would find at home. Indeed, four out of
the fourteen leading companies in wind turbine generator technology
listed in the ITA’s 2008 report are joint ventures between a Chinese
company and a foreign company.142
Also, in an artificial but practical sense, Chinese companies help
foreign companies meet local content requirements. For example,
Chinese regulations require foreign wind turbine manufacturers to
manufacture a certain percentage of their equipment in China,143 and
one convenient way for foreign firms to meet these requirements is to
form partnerships with local manufacturers.
While this article considers partnerships as a return factor, they
are also a risk factor. Partnerships not only create profitable business
models, but also mitigate the risk that the Chinese companies will
misappropriate the IP of their foreign counterparts.
First,
maintaining trust and reliability in these partnerships is key to
success, and IP theft can jeopardize such a relationship. Second, as
142

46.

143

Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra
note 55, at 355–56.
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discussed earlier, many Chinese firms do not have the absorptive
capacity to turn stolen IP directly into marketable products and
services. They are dependent on their foreign counterparts for
complementary technology, just as the foreign firms are dependent
on them for their low costs and knowledge of the local business
environment.

IV. EMPIRICAL AND ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE IPR REGIME
The number of patent applications filed in China, including
applications filed by foreign firms, has increased significantly since
the early 2000s, reflecting increased confidence in the environment
for IPR in China. Filing patent applications requires time and money,
and firms have less of an incentive to file patent applications if they
do not believe that there is a reasonable chance those patents will be
enforced.
Figure 3 shows the total number of patent applications filed in
China and the respective shares of foreign and Chinese patent
applications in total patent applications in China over the period
1990–2011.144 Prior to China’s accession to the WTO, foreign patent
applications reached a maximum of 30,343 and total patent

144
Data in Figures 3, 4, and 5 come from both the China Statistical
Yearbooks and the State Intellectual Property Office. Pre-2000 data come
from the yearbooks and data from 2000 onward come from the State
Intellectual Property Office. See Statistics, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., http://English.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/ (last visited Jan. 3,
2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1999; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1998; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1997; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1996; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1995; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1994; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1993; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1992; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1991; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
1990. Annual statistics published in the China Statistical Yearbooks can also
be found at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata.
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applications reached a maximum of 170,682; by 2011, those figures
climbed to 128,677 and 1,633,347, respectively.145
Figure 3

Total Patent Applications in
China by Year, 1990-2011

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property
Office
These data aggregate all types of patent applications in China
(invention patents, design patents, and utility model patents), but
Yang explains that foreign firms have filed much lower numbers of
applications for utility model patents in China than Chinese firms
have.146 Yang attributes this trend to the fact that most foreign patent
systems do not have an equivalent to the utility model patent, causing
some foreign firms to not understand them.147 As such, applications
for utility model patents have limitations as a proxy for foreign
confidence in China’s IPR system. Figure 4 modifies the data in
145

Id.
Stephen Yang, Utility Model in China – an Overlooked but
Powerful Tool, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.managingip.com/Article/2176035/An-overlooked-but-powerfultool.html.
147
Id.
146
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Figure 3 by removing utility model patent applications, and it shows
an increase in the share of foreign patent applications.
Figure 4

Total Patent Applications in
China by Year Excluding
Applications for Utility Model
Patents, 1990-2011

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property
Office
Another limitation of the data in these figures is that they include
applications for patents related to all kinds of technology, not just
renewable energy technology. Drawing on data from the China
Statistical Yearbook, I selected eighty-nine classifications of patents
that have potential applications in renewable energy technology,148 as
they constitute a more representative sample of trends in renewable
energy patenting. Figure 5 shows applications by year for these
eighty-nine selected patent types over the period of 2002–2010. The
sample is not a perfect proxy for renewable energy technology, and it
148
I selected the eighty-nine patent classifications in consultation with
Dr. Kelly Sims Gallagher, Associate Professor of Energy and Environmental
Policy, the Fletcher School, Tufts University.
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does not distinguish between foreign and Chinese applications, as
this data is not available for most years. Conclusions should be
drawn from this data with caution, but the data offers a closer picture
of trends in renewable energy technology transfer than do all the
patent data aggregated together, and they show a steady increase in
applications over the period considered.
Figure 5

Applications for Selected Categories of
Patents with Potential Applications in
Renewable Energy Technology, 20022010

Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property
Office
Overall, the evidence suggests that foreign confidence in China’s
IPR regime has increased significantly over the reform period,
including in renewable energy. Legal reforms, developments in
enforcement, and low absorptive capacity have mitigated the extent
to which concerns about IPR present risk to foreign transferors of
technology.
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B. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE IPR REGIME
This section considers the experiences of three energy
companies—U.S. solar power company GT Solar, Danish wind
power company Vestas, and U.S. energy company General
Electric—as they have developed their renewable energy operations
in China. These three companies do not represent the full range of
experiences that foreign renewable energy companies have had in
China, but they represent examples of companies that are confident
enough in China’s environment for IP that they have been willing to
transfer their IP into the Chinese market. Furthermore, all three of
these companies have dramatically expanded their renewable energy
operations in the latter half of the 2000s, as soaring demand for
energy in China has created greater demand for renewable energy
and the new policy framework has put in place stronger incentives to
invest.
1. GT SOLAR
In 2006, GT Equipment Technologies changed its name to GT
Solar (GT).149 CEO Kedar Gupta explained the rationale behind the
name change in a 2006 press release:
This name change reflects the fact that most of the
business we're conducting around the globe is in
the solar, or photovoltaic, energy industry . . . . It's
one of the fastest growing industries in the world,
and GT Solar has become an industry leader. Our
name now makes it clear that we are in the
business of enabling technology, manufacturing

149
GT Equipment Technologies is Now “GT Solar,” BUS. WIRE, Aug.
23, 2006, available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/. GT
Solar then changed its name to GT Advanced Technologies in 2011. This
section focuses on the company’s activities during the time that it was called
GT Solar. Press Release, GT Advanced Technologies, GT Solar Completes
Name Change to GT Advanced Technologies (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://investor.gtat.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=211850&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1594054&highlight=.
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and equipment solutions for the solar industry
worldwide.150
In the process of “enabling technology, manufacturing and
equipment solutions for the solar industry worldwide,” 151 the
favorable conditions for technology transfer and the renewable
energy industry discussed earlier in this article allowed GT to make
major inroads in the solar photovoltaic market and invest in the
transfer of technology to China.
GT signed its first contract in China in 2002,152 and in the period
from November 2004 to February 2010, GT signed at least nine
contracts with Chinese firms, for a total value of approximately $418
million.153 Moreover, as GT did more and more business in China
over this period, it quickly transferred an increased amount of
technology. In 2004, GT signed a contract to sell direct solidification
150
BUS. WIRE., GT Equipment Technologies is Now “GT Solar,” supra
note 149.
151
Id.
152
Press Release, GT Advanced Technologies, GT Solar Ships 1,000th
DSS450 Crystalline Ingot Growth Furnace (July 12, 2010), http://inve
stor.gtat.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=211850&p=irolnewsArticle_print&ID=1446331&highlight=.
153
See GT Equipment Signs over $33 Million Contract with Chinese
Co.; LDK Solar Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. To Buy 75 MW Solar Wafer Fabrication
Line, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.businesswire.com/
portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar to Equip One of Largest Solar Wafer Factories
in World, BUS. WIRE, July 31, 2007, http://www.businesswire.com/portal
/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar and Jiangxi Sornid Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. Announce New
Order Totaling More than $20 Million for GT Solar’s GT-DSS450 Ingot
Growth Furnace, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.bus
inesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Signs Polysilicon Reactor
Contract With Chinese Company, BUS. WIRE, June 11, 2007,
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Signs More than
$40 Million in New Contracts with GCL-Poly, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.businesswire.com /portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Technologies
Signs $9.5 million Contract in China; Baoding Tianwei Ying li of China
Adds Wafer Capacity for Solar Cells, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 12, 2004,
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar & Trina Solar
Sign $49MM Polysilicon Reactor Contract, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 11, 2008,
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar & Yingli Green
Energy Sign $56M Silicon Furnace Contract, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.
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system furnaces to Baoding Tianwei Yingli New Energy
Resources. 154 In July 2007, GT signed contracts to sell a more
advanced model to two Chinese companies: Glory Silicon Energy
and Yingli Green Energy.155
Each of these three contracts is a relatively restricted example of
technology transfer, as GT was simply transferring equipment, rather
than developing it with a Chinese partner or teaching a Chinese
partner how to improve upon it, but GT has also engaged in broader
technology transfer. In 2005, GT began transferring more tacit
knowledge through a contract to create a 75MW wafer fabrication
turnkey line for the Chinese firm LDK.156 At first glance, this may
seem like another example of very basic technology transfer, but GT
transferred more than just equipment in this arrangement. According
to GT’s Project Manager for the LDK facility, Charles Hagopian,
“GT was involved from the very beginning with LDK Solar in the
design of its factory, the installation of GT's equipment, and the
training of LDK’s employees.” 157 More recently, under two 2010
contracts with subsidiaries of a Chinese firm, GCL-Poly Energy
Holdings, GT committed to transferring “equipment, technology, and
know-how” to the two subsidiaries.158
GT also established a base in China from which to facilitate the
diffusion of technology. In 2006, GT established GT Solar
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd., with offices in Shanghai and Beijing,159 and in
2008, GT announced plans to build and operate a polysilicon facility
154
BUS. WIRE, GT Solar Technologies Signs $9.5 million Contract in
China; Baoding Tianwei Yingli of China Adds Wafer Capacity for Solar
Cells, supra note 153.
155
BUS. WIRE, GT Solar to Equip One of Largest Solar Wafer
Factories in World, supra note 153; BUS. WIRE, GT Solar & Yingli Green
Energy Sign $56M Silicon Furnace Contract, supra note 153.
156
BUS. WIRE, GT Equipment Signs over $33 Million Contract with
Chinese Co.; LDK Solar Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. to Buy 75 MW Solar Wafer
Fabrication Line, supra note 153.
157
GT Solar Technologies Installs Turnkey Solar Wafer Line At LDK
Solar; LDK Solar, China, Begins Production of One of World's Largest
Solar Manufacturing Lines, BUS. WIRE, May 4, 2006, http://www.busi
nesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.
158
BUS. WIRE, GT Solar Signs More than $40 Million in New Contracts
with GCL-Poly, supra note 153.
159
GT Solar Expands Presence in China, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2006,
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.
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in Lianyungang municipality, Jiangsu province.160 Finally, in 2009,
GT opened its Asian headquarters in Shanghai, a facility that GT
intends to use “to provide product demonstrations and training” to
Asian customers.161
These incremental increases in the quality of technology transfer
would not have occurred if GT was not confident that China would
protect GT’s IPR or that it would not receive an acceptable return on
its investment. GT’s experience with technology transfer was limited,
but it grew incrementally. GT did not go so far as to form any joint
ventures in China, but IPR were not a barrier to its operations there,
and it has taken advantage of increasing opportunities for deeper
technology transfer.
2. VESTAS
Vestas, the eighth-largest firm in the Chinese wind power
market as of 2011, 162 also took advantage of the environment for
renewable energy in China. While its position has slipped since,
Vestas reached the number-two position in 2006;163 in the process, it
sold more advanced technology to its customers in China and took a
greater interest in transferring know-how, as well.
Lewis notes that Vestas is relatively conservative about
importing its IP into China, preferring to retain ownership over its
technology.164 However, like GT, Vestas benefited from transferring
160
BUS. WIRE, GT Solar & Trina Solar Sign $49MM Polysilicon
Reactor Contract, supra note 153.
161
GT Solar Opens New Asia Headquarters in Shanghai, BUS. WIRE,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.
162
China World’s Wind Power Leader, XINHUA (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2012-03/23/content_24970321.htm.
163
Joanna I. Lewis, A Comparison of Wind Power Industry
Development Strategies in Spain, India and China, CENTER FOR RESOURCE
SOLUTIONS, 15 fig.8 (2007), http://www.resourcesolutions.org/lib/librarypd
fs/Lewis.Wind.Industry. Development.India.Spain.China.July.2007.pdf.
164
See Joanna I. Lewis, From Technology Transfer to Local
Manufacturing: China’s Emergence in the Global Wind Power Industry,
Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum at
9 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/doc
s/CEF.Talk.Lewis.10.06.ppt.
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increasingly sophisticated equipment to its Chinese customers. On
December 17, 2009, Vestas announced that it recently received the
first order for its V60-850 kW turbine, designed specifically for
Chinese customers, from China Datang Renewable Power Co., Ltd.
(Datang). 165 Just eleven days later, Vestas announced that Datang
ordered a line of more advanced turbine from Vestas, the V90-2.0
MW turbine.166
Vestas was actually transferring softer technology to China as
early as 2007. Vestas opened two manufacturing facilities in
Tianjian in 2007: a generator factory and a factory for the assembly
of nacelles and hubs.167 In order to prepare the Tianjin facility to
begin manufacturing V52-850 kW turbines, Vestas invited Chinese
employees to its nacelle factory in Taranto, Italy to train with the
Italian team for two months.168
While Vestas’s experience with technology transfer is not as
deep as GT’s, its decision to abandon its restrictive model of
technology transfer reflects that it recognized that its future in China
requires greater Chinese ownership of its know-how.
3. GENERAL ELECTRIC
General Electric (GE) has been doing business in China for over
100 years,169 and it has proactively taken advantage of the favorable
165

Press Release, Vestas, Vestas Receives First Order for Its Made-forChina Wind Turbine (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/
EN/Press_releases/Local/2009/CH_091217_LPR_UK_07.pdf.
166
Press Release, Vestas, Valued Chinese partner shows confidence in
Vestas product line (Dec. 28, 2009), a http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/
EN/Press_releases/Local/2009/CH_091228_LPR_UK_08.pdf.
167
Press Release, Vestas, Customer day at Vestas’ manufacturing
facilities in Tianjin, China (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.vestas.com/files//
Filer/EN/Press_releases/Local/2007/AP070920LPMUK01.pdf.
168
Vestas, Taranto Technology Transfer, 12 WIND, OIL, & GAS, May
2008, at 45, available at http://nozebra.ipapercms.dk/Vestas/Vestas
Wind/UK/1208/?Page=43.
169
GE, People's Republic of China Sign Memorandum of
Understanding on Environmental Technology; Energy, Water, Rail,
Aviation, Lighting Opportunities Included; Energy and Environment
Research Pact with Tsinghua University Also Signed, BUS. WIRE, May 29,
2006, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/ge/index.jsp?ndmViewId=n
ews_view&newsId=20060528005017&newsLang=en&ndmConfigId=10011
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environment for renewable energy in China in the last few years. In
a September 2009 interview, Tim Schweikert, president of GE
Transportation China, said that GE views China as its “second home
market,” because of China’s size and growth. 170 GE made
technology transfer a regular part of its business in China, but GE
only recently moved into renewable energy technology transfer in
China. Unlike GT, which specializes entirely in renewable energy
technology, GE has a wide variety of operations in different energy
sources, such as oil and gas.
GE laid the groundwork for technology transfer in China in the
early 2000s, but it did not fully commit itself to renewable energy in
China. In 2000, GE established the China Technology Center in
Shanghai, 171 although the center only played a supporting role in
research at the time. 172 GE was also providing gas turbines and
related equipment to Chinese firms in the early 2000s,173 and some
GE turbines had been assembled in China as of 2006, under a
technology transfer agreement.174
GE then strengthened its relationships in China by signing a
memorandum of understanding with China’s National Development
and Reform Commission in 2006. 175 The motivation for the
agreement, according to GE, was “the growing synergy between
China's needs and GE technology, explicitly allowing for GE to
09&vnsId=681.
170
Jialu Chen, ‘Global Reset’ Sees China Poised for Growth, CHINA
DAILY, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009summerda
vos/200909/12/content_8684235.htm.
171
Kevin Bullis, GE to Boost Research in China, TECH. REV., Apr. 8,
2010, http://www.technologyreview.com/ energy/25008/.
172
Id.
173
GE Wins Contracts of US$900M to Supply Gas Turbines for Power
Plants in China, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 7, 2003, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
GE+Wins+Contracts+of+US$900M+to+Supply+Gas+Turbines+for+Power+
Plants...-a098467131.
174
GE, NTC Shipped First China-Assembled 9E Gas Turbine, GE IN
CHINA, no. 10 (Gen. Elec., Fairfield, Conn.), July, 2006, available at
http://www.ge.com.cn/enewsletter/geinchina10.htm#business3.
175
BUS. WIRE, GE, People's Republic of China Sign Memorandum of
Understanding on Environmental Technology; Energy, Water, Rail, Aviation,
Lighting Opportunities Included; Energy and Environment Research Pact
with Tsinghua University Also Signed, supra note 169.
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provide advanced technologies to China,” including renewable
energy technology.176 Under the agreement, GE agreed to provide up
to $50 million in funding for “eco-related” research to the China
Technology Center, as well as management and leadership training
for up to 2,500 Chinese managers and leaders, through 2011.177 GE
itself explained that this increasing cooperation with China is the
result of policy and financial incentives put in place by the Chinese
government, as well as a synergy that enhances GE’s bottom line.178
Most recently, in August 2009, GE Drivetrain Technologies, a unit of
GE Transportation, formed a joint venture with a Chinese company,
Chongqing XinXing Fengneng Investment Co., Ltd. (XinXing), to
produce drivetrain gears for wind turbines in China. 179 Under the
terms of the agreement, XinXing is the majority shareholder in the
joint venture,180 reflecting GE’s willingness to invest in technology
transfer to its Chinese partners.
GE made use of its reputation and relationships in China, as well
as the favorable policy environment, to develop a successful business
model for renewable energy in China. In doing so, it allowed its
Chinese counterparts, such as the GE Technology Center, to play a
major role in research and development.

V. CONCLUSION
Despite arguments from industrialized and developing countries
that IPR are a barrier to technology transfer, the evidence shows that
concerns over IPR are not a significant barrier to the transfer of
renewable energy technology to China. The potential for growth in
China’s renewable energy sector and the policy support for that
growth, the relative insignificance of IP premiums as a factor in
pricing, and the incentives for foreign firms to partner with Chinese
firms provide foreign firms with enough expected return on its
investment in technology transfer.
176

Id.
Id.
178
Bullis, supra note 171.
179
Press Release, Gen. Elec., GE Drivetrain Technologies and
Chongqing XinXing Gear Finalize Joint Venture, Launch Gear Business for
Wind Turbine Industry (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.genewscenter.com/
content/Detail.aspx?ReleaseID=7643&NewsAreaID=2.
180
Id.
177
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Even with high expected returns, technology transfer in the
broader sense—encompassing the transfer of knowledge-based
assets—would not occur if foreign firms felt that the risk in exposing
their IP to a loosely regulated market was too high. The data
presented in this paper, however, show that China’s efforts to reform
its IPR laws since the 1990s produced greater confidence among
foreign firms in China’s ability to protect their IPR. Indeed, the
experiences of the three individual companies considered here—GT,
Vestas, and GE—show that, at the very least, concerns over IPR do
not have to be a significant barrier in technology transfer.
There are limitations to the discussion in this article, and issues
for further investigation remain. First, this article relies on proxy
evidence to support some of its conclusions, as some data that is
specific to the renewable energy sector is difficult to obtain. For this
reason, the author draws some conclusions with caution. Second,
this article does not examine any normative hypotheses. The roles of
China and other countries in international efforts to stop global
climate change are subjects of debate, and this article investigates
only whether concerns over IPR have been a barrier to technology
transfer, not whether they should be. Finally, the relationship
between IPR and technology transfer is not static, and this paper only
investigates the relationship between IPR and technology transfer up
to a point in time. Absorptive capacity is currently an issue for
Chinese firms, but that capacity will increase as those firms develop
their own technology and expertise in the coming years. China has
made remarkably fast progress in several national-level indicators,
such as its gross domestic product 181 and share of its population
above the poverty line,182 and there is no reason to believe that China
must or will rely on foreign renewable energy technology forever.
At the same time, it is possible that the quality of IPR protection will
continue to improve enough to deter IP leakage in the renewable
energy industry, or foreign and Chinese firms may become so
181
See, e.g., World Development Indicators and Global Development
Finance: China, WORLD BANK (last visited July 24, 2012)
http://databank.worldbank.org/Data/Views/Reports/TableView.aspx?IsShare
d=true&IsPopular=country (select “China”).
182
See, e.g., id.; see also United Nations Statistics Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Millennium Development Goals
Indicators, UNITED NATIONS, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/data.aspx (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012) (select “China”).
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interdependent that their shared stakes in mutual success deter the
theft of IP. Regardless of how the relationship between IPR and
technology transfer in the renewable energy sector evolves, the
global importance of renewable energy, especially in China, deserves
continued attention.

